The Weekly Gut Check - Vol. 93
RB Splits Revisited: Has Fantasy Football Gone to RBBC in a Hand Basket?
6/21/07

The “Gut Feeling” is often synonymous with a sense of desperation resulting from a lack of preparation. The Gut Check is a huge proponent of studying the numbers, but there’s a point where one can place too much emphasis on the wrong information. This can result in the undervaluing or overlooking a player’s potential. Therefore, The Weekly Gut Check is devoted to examining the frame of reference behind certain number-driven guidelines that fantasy football owners use to make decisions.

Although The Weekly Gut Check doesn’t claim to be psychic, he does believe that he can dispel certain numbers biases and help you make the best choices for your team. We’ll keep a running tally of The Weekly Gut Check’s insights. This way you can gauge his views as something to seriously consider, or at least seriously consider running the opposite way as fast as you can!

1. Technically, most teams have long used an RBBC approach.
   
   
2. The average #1 RB on a team only had 56% of the carries, 58% of the rushing yardage, and 54% of the rushing scores.
   
   
3. The average #1 RB had nearly 3 times the productivity of the average #2 RB on a depth chart.
   
   
4. Health is a significant reason why #2 RBs see increased time. The stud backs (gainers of 1400+ yards) played in 2.5 more games (15.44 games) during the season than starters with less than 1000 total yards (13.92 games).
   
   
5. There were also nearly as many stud backs with over 1400 yards, as there were 2nd and 3rd tier starters during this three-year span.
   
   
6. The most productive #1 backs fit a clear statistical profile in addition playing more games than the best of the rest.
   
   
   • 10 of the 12 (83%) backs had a quarterback with at least 3400 yards passing.
     
   • 10 of the 12 (83%) backs had a quarterback with at least 20 touchdown throws.
     
   • 8 of the 12 (67%) backs had a quarterback with at least a 60% completion pct.
     
   • 11 of the 12 (93%) backs were on an offense with one player (TE or WR) with at least 60 receptions, and another with at least 50 catches.
     
   • 13 receivers had at least 70 receptions while splitting opportunities with 11 of these backs.

It’s clear most of the top runners last year were on highly productive passing offenses. What someone should take from this is the true meaning of a balanced offense doesn’t mean a close to 50/50 split between run and pass. Balance is more about teams effectively running and passing with high productivity when they choose to do so.

Let’s see whether the 2006 NFL season looks similar to 2003-2005’s averages beginning with the league overall. The first table below shows the average rushing totals for the top three ground gainers on an NFL team between 2003-2005 regardless of position. The second shows the same averages for 2006:

On the surface, there was a slight increase in the #2 RB’s stats in comparison to the previous three-year average. While there were some heralded exceptions, it doesn’t appear the supposed trend towards a RBBC possess the legs to support the hype. In fact, the primary ground gainer on an NFL team still has nearly 3 times the productivity of the second-leading rusher behind him in terms of attempts, yards, and rushing touchdowns. These numbers weren’t hard to compile, so why is the committee approach still often seen as an inevitable thing?

The Gut Check believes when the general sports fan listens to journalists and analysts harp on the idea that NFL teams need two good backs on a team, he infers from the statement that the coach desires to have an equal partnership between two backs. This assumption is incorrect: Most teams want a feature back that can stay on the field in passing situations and carry the ball enough times to wear out a defense in the 2nd half. In fact, they want a back that can accomplish these two objectives with a high degree of consistency for hopefully 19 or 20 games.

The reason why teams need two good backs has more to do with this last statement. The position of running back is one of the most punishing in football. The average career for a runner is among the shortest of any position. A starting RB missing time during a season has a noticeable impact on the productivity of a team’s ground game. That’s the true nature of a “committee” for most teams. If the team doesn’t have a feature back, or loses their star and doesn’t have an adequate substitute, then a committee will be the course of action.

Between 2003-2006, the average starting runner that gained at least 1400 yards for his team played in nearly 2.5 more games than the starting runner with less than 1000 total yards. It is becoming rapidly clear that having two good runners on a team is more about a team anticipating the first not able to play every game in a season. It has little to do with splitting time equitably between them. There are exceptions to this statement, but generally a situation where teams split the workload between two or more runners is more often due to the starter suffering an injury and not a pre-determined plan.

Committees of Similar Workload

Let’s profile the 2006 teams with two backs sharing a more even split of the carries than last season’s average. As one can see, only 12.5% of the NFL had this even of a distribution (less than 10% difference in attempts between at least two players on the depth chart).

It appeared Kevan Barlow would be the natural starter after the Jets acquired him from the Niners, but a calf injury cost him four games. He was also not as effective (note his 2.82 yards per carry average) as his fellow runners on the depth chart. The fact New York acquired Thomas Jones from Chicago during the off-season shows the Jets weren’t comfortable with their depth chart. Jones had 63% of the Bears rush attempts in 2006. Do you really believe the Jets are planning to cut Jones’ percentage of attempts anywhere close to Barlow’s 2006 workload?

Here’s a second team with a rookie sharing the load. Unlike the Jets’ Washington, a mid-round pick, Maroney was a first-round prospect expected to make an immediate impact. This was a very even split except for the fact that Dillon was used more often at the goal line. It appeared the Patriots planned to gradually work Maroney into the lineup as he acclimated to the pro game. The fact that Dillon is no longer with the team and New England did not make a major transaction to acquire a known commodity or revered prospect at RB supports the idea that Maroney will be the featured back in this offense.

Let’s see here, Domanick Williams (formerly Davis), a top ten fantasy back prior to injury, but he was subsequently released after his knee did not heal sufficiently. So to safeguard this possibility, the Texans acquired Gado and Dayne. Do you really think Houston expected late round pick Wali Lundy to immediately handle over one-third of the rushing attempts? This was definitely a situation where Gary Kubiak was plugging in backs on a trial basis to see if one of them would show enough to take the job outright. The result? Ahman Green is now a Texan. Maybe the former Packer may not be the workhorse he was a few years ago, but the Gut Check believes Houston hopes Green has 1-2 years left at 80%-90% of is best years.

Right away, one can see the similarities between the Colts’ and Pats RB tandems. Each had a first round rookie back gradually acclimated to the offense. Each had a veteran who had a pretty even split with the rookie and is no longer with the team. Like the Pats, the Colts did not acquire a significant complementary back for the depth chart. Addai should get at least half of Rhodes’ previous attempts in 2007.

All four of these teams clearly moved towards a feature back system with an acquisition of a proven veteran or the release of the second back without replenishing the depth chart with comparable skill. The talk of the NFL moving towards a committee system of runners makes little sense from this perspective.

Committees as Separately Defined Roles

Still, there’s another way to view the meaning of an RBBC. Each player has a defined role in the offense that isn’t as even from a carries standpoint, but the second back is highly productive in a different, but quantifiable way. When one defines the committee in this way, there are another four teams—again, just 12.5% of the NFL—that meet this definition.

Jones may have had twice the carries and nearly twice the yardage, but Barber III was clearly the redzone back. So much so, Barber III was a top twelve RB in fantasy leagues! Although Barber III proved quite valuable, the Gut Check would be wary to take Barber over any of the backs that were rookies in a committee last year, but will now get the lion’s share of the workload. There aren’t good odds to successfully rely on big points with fewer opportunities. Carries are a much more valuable commodity as a predictor of fantasy success. With a new coaching staff and offensive scheme, do you want to rely on Barber III to repeat this success over more sure-fire circumstances? Even if you agree with the Gut Check that Barber III was, and has proven, he’s the better all-around back, we’re not the decision makers for the Cowboys and Jones does have the coveted breakaway speed that Barber III lacks.

Other committee possibilities in 2007 include:

• Minnesota—see New England and Indy.
  
  
• Carolina—although DeAngelo Williams is on the fast track to be the main man with a zone blocking attack that best matches his talents—again, see New England and Indy’s situation.
  
  
• Oakland—doubt it, but Rhodes could be to Jordan what he has been to Addai and James.
  
  
• Washington—if you really believe Gibbs plans to split the carries evenly—yours truly doesn’t.

So if you’re keeping count, there are twelve teams in the league with some recent historical precedence from 2006 where a committee is a possibility. The Gut Check believes that, barring injury, only two of these teams have a high probability of being an RBBC—and only of the type that involves distinct roles rather than an equitable split in carries.

As just touched upon, injury really is the deciding factor that influences many a committee approach. In most cases, the committee is a contingency plan. So one key to landing a good fantasy running back is to pick a player that remains durable throughout the year—that’s generally where the luck factor falls into place. It is wise to determine if the runner is a good fit within the offensive philosophy, or possesses an all-around game so when he is on the field in passing situations his presence still makes it believable for the defense to play pass when the call will be run.

Before the Gut Check identifies some of these players, let’s look at the level of production that separates the average runners from the good ones, and the good ones from the greats. In last year’s column the Gut Check calculated the workload for the average NFL back within specific yardage tiers for 2003-2005. Here’s that same table and then a table with 2006’s averages.

Surprisingly there were nearly as many runners in the first tier from 2003-2005 as there were in the second and third tier combined.

Now with four years of data there appears to be a trend where in even years there are fewer stud backs and more third tier backs followed by odd years with more top-end runners and less of the third tier. Is the Gut Check suggesting major injuries occur in even years? Of course not, but the data suggests an influx of rookies, significant injuries, and retirements provides a slight adjustment to the top end and third tier while the second tier remains more constant. To support this idea it’s worth noting five of the eight RBBC candidates profiled above had a #1 RB with 1000-1199 yards and four of the five had a rookie as a part of this tandem.

This information is one of the reasons why it still makes sense to go with a Stud RB approach in the early rounds—especially when competing owners are buying into the impending doom of the RBBC. These owners feel there are only 5-6 worthy backs and then a high number of backs in the next tier they can grab after a receiver. They believe it makes more sense to grab a top receiver. But they are missing out on these second tier runners

In theory, this value-based drafting strategy makes sense. Recent history shows there have only been 6-9 stud backs in a given season. This number does increase by 2-3 runners when one includes point per reception scoring systems, but so does the value of stud receivers and tight ends. Yet theory and reality don’t always complement each other. Despite the widespread knowledge of value-based drafting, the Stud RB approach is one of the most common, early round draft strategies in non-auction formats.

Proponents of value-base drafting will argue that Stud RB strategists are drafting to fill the position over those players’ true value. As a result, VBD owners believe the Stud RB strategy can force you to miss out on the best players. On the other hand, if the value-based drafter in a 12-team league picks a couple of receivers or a quarterback-receiver with his first two picks and the rest of the league picks runners, he could wind up with only the lowest tiers of backs on his roster. The VBD owner will often say he’ll just use his great value picks as collateral to trade for a runner. The problem is that owner will need to find someone that will agree to a trade! Even if he does, will the deal net him what he believes his players are worth?

Both strategies have their risks and rewards, but no draft theory will work for you unless you know your league. If you don’t have a bead on the league tendencies prior to the draft, it’s a good idea to look up from your calculations and observe what is actually happening in your draft. Going against the grain can be highly beneficial, but only to a point. The Gut Check has frequently heard experienced owners use the excuse “these backs were grossly over valued, so I loaded up on other positions.” Have these owners ever thought that maybe they grossly over valued their theory at the expense of adjusting to what was actually happening in front of them! We all make mistakes, but blaming a league’s tendency as strange rather than making the adjustment is a cop-out. Intelligence and wisdom are separate qualities. Having a good pre-draft strategy shows intelligence, but demonstrating the ability to use that strategy as a guideline and not the rule shows wisdom.

The point is the Gut Check doesn’t believe these numbers give you a definitive reason to pursue one draft strategy over another. The information thus far shows if anything, the more games a starter plays, the greater he produces in the stat column. A more practical application for this research is to see which players accounted for the highest percentage of their team’s ground attack in key categories. Based on the stats you’ll read about below, The Gut Check believes than in order for you to feel good about your starting backfield, you need to target two runners you think will earn at least 20 attempts per game and rush for at least 1200 yards. In 2005, 75% of the top 12 scorers on the ground were the all-purpose backs in their offense.

Of 2006’s top 13 scoring backs—only 62.5% of the top TD-scoring backs were all-purpose runners for their squad. The number is once again 75% if one eliminates Mike Bell from the list and makes Frank Gore the 12th back based on his total production—a reasonable change.

So do these 2006 backs have the same things in common with their 2005 brethren?

• Only 6 of the 12 (50%) backs had a quarterback with at least 3400 yards passing—half the amount from 2006—and that’s if one includes the combined yardage of the Cowboys’ quarterbacks to include Marion Barber III. The percentage actually jumps to 67% if one includes quarterbacks that threw for at least 3200 yards.
  
  
• Only 6 of the 12 (50%) backs had a quarterback with at least 20 touchdowns throws, but if one includes the combined stats of Pittsburgh and Dallas’ quarterbacks the figure increases to 67%.
  
  
• 10 of the 12 (83%) backs had a quarterback with at least a 60% completion pct (if one rounds up Roethilsberger’s 59.7% mark).
  
  
• 5 of the 12 (42%) backs were on an offense with one player (TE or WR) with at least 60 receptions, and another with at least 50 catches, but that number increases to 8 of 12 (67%) if one drops the second receiver’s catches to 49.
  
  
• 11 receivers had at least 70 receptions while splitting opportunities with 6 of these backs. That number jumps to 19 receivers when they have at least 60 receptions while splitting opportunities with 10 backs.

Although these percentages dropped in 2006 with three, prominent role playing goal line backs (Dillon, Barber III, and Bell) the figures indicate that most of the top runners are on highly productive passing offenses. The true meaning of a balanced offense doesn’t mean a close to 50/50 split between run and pass. Balance is more about teams effectively running and passing with high productivity when they choose to do so.

Which categories might help a fantasy owner determine which backs will be stud runners? The chart below displays the runners that accounted for the highest percentage of rushing touchdowns for their team in 2006. As you may have noticed, the top yardage runners aren’t always the top scorers. Tiki Barber is nowhere to be found on this list, because Brandon Jacobs accounted for 64% of the Giants rushing scores last year. If you are in league that minimizes yardage, Barber’s value was much lower than his stud status in standard scoring, or point per reception leagues. While Thomas Jones and Kevin didn’t have awesome touchdown stats, they accounted for enough of their teams ground scores to be decent #2 fantasy RBs.

Leaders in attempts differ little from the top yardage backs. The only difference is Tomlinson on this list and Henry on the other list. Steven Jackson had the breakout many predicted last year and the more balanced attack of Scott Linehan did wonders for his opportunities. Frank Gore split carries in 2005 with Kevan Barlow, but his 2006 production was due to the fact he became the unquestioned starter. Look for Laurence Maroney and Joseph Addai to get into this 300+ carry range in 2007. The same might be said for DeAngelo Williams if he wins the Carolina job outright.

Speaking of attempts per game, let’s focus this much-discussed topic. The Gut Check overhears a lot of fantasy owners correcting each other about the fact that runners rarely get 20 rushes per game. They claim this number is more a sum of rush attempts and targets as receivers. Is this true? Here’s another look at the average output of runners by their tiers of production from 2003-2005 and 2006.

Nearly 38% (36 out of 96) of the starting backs between 2003-2005 averaged at least 20 attempts per game. In 2006 the first two tiers of runners had an overall average of 20 carries per game, a rate of 34%. If one is looking at a draft board and knows it’s likely that 1/3 of the league’s RBs will get an average of 20 carries per game and that half of the runners in the top ten from the year before will no longer make the top ten, then it supports the idea of adhering to a Stud RB strategy. But the Gut Check believes its more important to pick 3-4 backs in the top half of a fantasy draft—not consecutively, but its sensible to pick a 3rd back where one might select a QB when historically, QBs are often found at a good value after round five.

Larry Johnson was the most well fed runner in the NFL last season. This supports the Gut Check’s point about Edgerrin James league-leading attempts per game in 2005. Teams don’t simply give a back more carries because they are keying on another offensive player. The Chiefs didn’t have any other players that defenses would pay nearly as much attention to as Johnson and the KC back still averaged 26 attempts per game. By the way, last year the Gut Check said “If Colts’ rookie Joseph Addai earns the opportunity to start and receives even 60% of Indy’s rushing attempts from last year (nearly 20% less than James earned), the former LSU Tiger should exceed 1100 yards if he just averages the same yards per carry as his predecessor.” Addai got 62% of Edge’s 2005 attempts and nearly topped that 1100-yard mark (1081).

Naturally, attempts per game carries over to consistency of performance. 70% of the backs with a top 10 Crank Score for their position were also in the top 10 for attempts per game.

Based on the numbers, the Gut Check’s advice on selecting starting backs is simple. First, select players that remained healthy throughout the preseason (or leading up to your draft). Next, seek out runners that play on prolific passing offenses because a balanced team keeps the opposing defenses from stacking the line of scrimmage to stop the run. Unless the team has a heralded rookie combined with an aging veteran or a back still having difficulty recuperating from injury, spend less time worrying about running back committees. Injuries are more often the reason for committees than a coach’s predetermined plan.